Programs have shown modest savings associated with care receipt in a Medicare accountable care organization (ACO). Whether these savings are affected by disease chronicity and the mechanisms through which they occur are unclear. In this context, we examined the association between Medicare ACO implementation and episode spending for 2 different cardiovascular conditions.
C ardiovascular disease is both highly prevalent and expensive, with severe events, such as acute myocardial infarction (AMI) and hospitalization for congestive heart failure (CHF) exacerbation, accounting for >$300 billion in Medicare spending annually. 1 Prior empirical work demonstrates that payments for AMI and CHF episodes vary widely across hospitals for reasons not completely explained by case-mix differences. 2, 3 Many interpret such variation as evidence of healthcare waste because of a fragmented delivery system. [4] [5] [6] [7] Thus, health policy reforms designed to reduce care fragmentation, like Medicare's rollout of accountable care organizations (ACOs), may help contain spending related to cardiovascular disease. 8 Indeed, initial evaluations of the Pioneer and Shared Savings Programs have shown modest savings associated with care receipt in a Medicare ACO. Whether these savings are affected by cardiovascular disease chronicity and the mechanisms through which they occur remain unknown. Given ACOs' focus on care coordination, one may anticipate that ACO effects are greatest for chronic conditions like CHF, which requires multiple care transitions. Moreover, because ACOs take a long-view approach, emphasizing population health and care management, they may selectively lower expenditures during the late (versus early) episode.
14 Payments for services rendered during this time period drive spending increases for cardiovascular hospitalizations. 15 It is also when other recent reforms (eg, bundled payments, readmission penalties) are expected to have little impact. In this context we analyzed national Medicare claims from beneficiaries admitted for CHF or AMI. After measuring total payments made on their behalf, we assessed for differences in early and late episode spending between beneficiaries who received care at ACO participating and nonparticipating hospitals. We had 2 hypotheses. First, receipt of care in an ACO participating hospital would have larger effects on spending >90 days after discharge from the index admission. Second, savings from receipt of care at an ACO participating hospital would differ across conditions as diverse as CHF and AMI.
METHODS

Study Population
We analyzed claims and enrollment data from the Medicare Provider and Analysis Review, Outpatient, and Carrier research identifiable files for a random 20% sample of Medicare feefor-service beneficiaries. Our study population consisted of beneficiaries ≥65 years of age who were admitted to an acute care hospital for a primary diagnosis of AMI or CHF between January 1, 2010 and October 1, 2014 (Table I in the Data  Supplement) . For inclusion, we required beneficiaries to have continuous enrollment in both Parts A and B of Medicare for 12 months prior and 12 months after their index admission (or in the case of those who subsequently died, during the time that they were alive). In the event that a beneficiary experienced multiple AMI or CHF episodes within the same calendar year, we only considered the first episode and excluded the others. We excluded beneficiaries who were discharged against medical advice and those from MD, which is not part of Medicare's Inpatient Prospective Payment System. We also excluded hospitals caring for <2 patients with AMI or CHF during the study period. Because of the sensitive nature of Medicare research identifiable files, requests to access them from qualified researchers trained in human subject confidentiality protocols may be sent to the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services.
Measuring Episode Payments
The primary outcome of our study was total price-standardized spending per episode. To measure this, we constructed a claims window encompassing the index admission and extending 365 days postdischarge and summed all payments made on a beneficiary's behalf during this period. We examined payments for inpatient, skilled nursing facility, rehabilitation, outpatient department, and professional services. Payments for durable medical equipment, home health, and medication were not captured in our analysis. We distinguished between early (index admission to 90 days postdischarge) and late (91-365 days postdischarge) episode spending. Our secondary outcomes were the major components of episode payments: (1) index admission, (2) readmissions, (3) professional services, and (4) postacute care.
We price-standardized all payments to account for geographic payment differences and add-on payments for
WHAT IS KNOWN
• Episode spending for cardiovascular diseases like acute myocardial infarction and congestive heart failure varies widely across hospitals due, in part, to a fragmented delivery system. • Thus, health policy reforms designed to reduce care fragmentation, such as Medicare's accountable care organizations, may help reduce the costs of cardiovascular care.
WHAT THE STUDY ADDS
• Although early episode spending (index admission to 90 days postdischarge) was unchanged, late episode spending (91-365 days postdischarge) decreased significantly among Medicare beneficiaries admitted with acute myocardial infarction and congestive heart failure to an accountable care organizations participating hospital.
• These spending reductions were driven by lower payments for readmissions during the late episode.
• Taken together, accountable care organizations may complement other health policy reforms, including bundled payments and readmission penalties, that target the early episode.
indirect medical education and disproportionate share hospitals, using methods described by the Medicare Payment Advisory Commission. 16 In addition, we inflation-adjusted all payments to 2014 US dollars.
Distinguishing Between ACO Participating and Nonparticipating Hospitals
Our independent variable of interest was admission to an ACO participating hospital. Of note, a beneficiary aligned with a Medicare ACO could be admitted to a nonparticipating hospital and vice versa. To distinguish between receipt of care at a Medicare ACO (Shared Savings Program or Pioneer) participating versus nonparticipating hospital, we used the Leavitt Partners ACO Database. This previously validated database contained 839 Medicare, Medicaid, and commercial ACOs at the time of our analysis. 17 Information on ACOs in the database is updated regularly from press releases, news articles, government announcements, conferences, personal and industry interviews, and other public records. Working with these data, we were also able to determine the organizational structure of the Medicare ACO in which the hospital participated (hospital-or physician-led or hospitalphysician partnership).
Statistical Analysis
We first assessed for differences between patients admitted to ACO participating versus nonparticipating hospitals in the pre-ACO contract period. We compared beneficiary age on admission, sex, race/ethnicity, and level of comorbidity (based on the hierarchical condition category method 18 ). The precontract period for a hospital varied according to the contract start date for the ACO in which it participated (January 2012, April 2012, July 2012, January 2013, or January 2014). Next, we assessed for differences in hospital characteristics between ACO participating and nonparticipating hospitals, using 2014 American Hospital Association Annual Survey data on hospital size, teaching status, and for-profit status. 19 Using an interrupted time series research design, we then tested the effect of hospital ACO participation on both early and late episode spending for our AMI and CHF cohorts. To do so, we fit longitudinal multivariable fixed effects regression models. Our main exposure was a binary, time-varying indicator for a hospital's ACO participation status (set to 1 during the quarter when the ACO in which the hospital participated began its Medicare contract and 0 otherwise). This approach allowed us to adjust for baseline trends. It also allowed us to account for rolling ACO contract start dates. We included in our models controls for beneficiary age, sex, race/ethnicity, and level of comorbidity (using 79 hierarchical condition categories), as well as hospital fixed effects, year fixed effects, and quarter fixed effects. We fit these models separately for early and late spending, as well as for each component payment category. To account for serially correlated outcomes, we estimated robust standard errors.
Finally, we conducted a series of sensitivity analyses. To determine whether the association between hospital participation and total episode spending differed between early and late adopters of the ACO model, we constructed separate models for hospitals whose ACOs had contract start dates in 2012, 2013, and 2014. We next examined if the effects of hospital participation were modified by ACO organizational structure (ie, whether the ACO was hospital-or physicianled or a hospital-physician partnership) by adding interaction terms for these characteristics to our primary models. Because practice patterns may change with increased experience, we fit models that included year lags for Medicare ACO participation.
We performed all analyses using SAS Version 9.4 (Cary, NC). Tests were 2-tailed, and we set the probability of Type 1 error at 0.05. Our institution's Health Sciences Institutional Review Board deemed this study to be exempt from its oversight.
RESULTS
Our study included 153 476 beneficiaries admitted for AMI to 2998 hospitals (401 ACO participating and 2597 nonparticipating hospitals) and 260 420 beneficiaries admitted for CHF to 3208 hospitals (412 ACO participating and 2796 nonparticipating hospitals). Table 1 compares structural differences between ACO participating and nonparticipating hospitals during the precontract period. ACO participating hospitals tended to be larger, were more likely to be teaching and nonprofit, and concentrated in the Northeast.
The characteristics of beneficiaries in the AMI and CHF cohorts during the pre-ACO contract period are shown in Table 1 . For both cohorts, beneficiaries admitted at ACO participating and nonparticipating hospitals had similar age and sex distributions. They also had similar levels of comorbid illness. Although ACO participating hospitals treated a higher proportion of black beneficiaries, this difference was not clinically meaningful. In terms of baseline spending, ACO participating hospitals had significantly higher mean early and late episode payments for both AMI and CHF cohorts. Figure 1 displays early and late payments for AMI and CHF episodes by year across ACO participating (stratified by their ACO contract start date) and nonparticipating hospitals. Although there was a general trend toward declining early episode spending for AMI (Figure 1A) , it remained relatively flat for CHF ( Figure 1C ). Although late episode spending for AMI ( Figure 1B ) and CHF ( Figure 1D ) also declined during the study interval, there was no noticeable separation of spending trends for ACO participating hospitals after the start of an ACO contract.
Results of our multivariable analysis are displayed in Table 2 . Admission to an ACO participating hospital was not associated with changes in early episode spending (AMI, $95 per beneficiary; 95% CI, −$481 to $671; CHF, $158; 95% CI, −$290 to $605). However, it was associated with significant reductions in late episode spending for both cohorts (AMI, −$680; 95% CI, −$1348 to −$11; CHF, −$889; 95% CI, −$1465 to −$313). These savings were driven by reductions in payments for readmissions during the late episode (Table II in the Data Supplement). Figure 2 illustrates findings from our sensitivity analyses. Estimated late episode savings were consistently seen in ACOs with contract start dates in 2012.
In addition, for the CHF cohort, hospital-led ACOs and organizations in the second year of their ACO contracts were associated with greater late episode spending reductions. However, contract start date, group organizational structure, and years of program experience did not modify Medicare ACO effects on early episode spending for either the AMI or CHF cohorts. 
DISCUSSION
We found that late episode spending decreased by $680 and $889 among beneficiaries admitted with AMI and CHF, respectively, to an ACO participating hospital. These spending reductions were driven by lower payments for readmissions during the late episode. To provide some context for our findings, we estimate that the Medicare program realized ≈$106.4 million in savings from the >26 000 beneficiaries in our study that received their inpatient AMI and CHF care at an ACO participating hospital. These savings were consistently greater in early ACO model adopters (ie, organizations with contract start dates in 2012). Initial evaluations of Medicare ACO programs have focused primarily on their global effects, demonstrating modest spending reductions related to receipt of care from participating provider groups. For instance, the first full year of Shared Savings Program contracts was associated with a 1.4% savings among 2012 program entrants; however, no savings were achieved by 2013 program entrants. 11 Furthermore, spending in Pioneer ACOs fell by 1.2% during the program's first year, but these reductions were substantially lower by year 2, leading to a net savings of just $67 per beneficiary in 2014. 10 Our study is the first to examine ACO effects on episode spending for 2 different cardiovascular diseases that are common in older adults.
To our surprise, we observed consistent results for AMI and CHF episodes. CHF is a chronic condition marked by acute exacerbations, involving multiple handoffs, 20 ,21 which we posited would lie more within the purview of ACOs than AMI-a sudden and severe event. Hence, our findings suggest positive spillovers from ACOs' processes for chronic disease management to acute cardiac conditions. Moreover, our findings on the drivers of savings in the late episode indicate possible mechanisms by which ACOs may exert their effects. An AMI or CHF admission at a hospital participating in an ACO could draw the organization's attention to the patient and trigger care management programs that facilitate care transitions. This long-view approach to improved cardiac management, which separates ACOs from other health policy reforms, results in savings through fewer readmissions in the late episode period.
Our study should be interpreted in the context of several limitations. Participation in an ACO is voluntary. Consequently, groups who chose to participate (as well as the patients whom they serve) may be different from those who do not. Although we controlled for observed patient factors and time-invariant hospital differences through our use of hospital fixed effects, we acknowledge that there may be unobserved differences confounding the observed association between ACO participation and episode spending. Our findings on higher baseline episode spending among participating hospitals and greater late episode savings among early ACO adopters lend support to the possibility of selfselection. Second, during the study period, Medicare launched several other payment reforms, including the Hospital Readmissions Reduction Program and the Bundled Payment for Care Initiative, which could also affect episode spending. However, it is important to note that these reforms target early episode payments, whereas the spending reductions that we observed were concentrated in the late episode.
Third, we acknowledge the possibility of differences in disease severity between beneficiaries admitted to participating and nonparticipating hospitals, which may confound the observed association. Although we used an established claims-based method for measuring levels of comorbidity, ACOs have incentives to code more intensively as a means to increase hierarchical condition category scores. 22 As such, for a given hierarchical condition category score, a beneficiary admitted to a participating hospital may be, on average, healthier than one admitted to a nonparticipating hospital.
Lastly, we examined admissions to ACO participating hospitals and episode spending related to those admissions, but Medicare beneficiaries retain choice and can use whatever hospital they want. Therefore, it is unlikely that all AMI and CHF admissions to ACO participating hospitals are made by ACO beneficiaries. To the extent that an ACO's effect on late episode spending is moder- Quarter 1 corresponded to January through March; quarter 2 corresponded to April through June; quarter 3 corresponded to July through September; and quarter 4 corresponded to October through December. Estimates for individual HCCs and hospital fixed effects are not listed due to space constraints but are available upon request. To understand the referent within this multivariable model, consider the following interpretation: When examining the association between gender and late episode spending among beneficiaries admitted for congestive heart failure, payments were, on average, $429 higher for women than men. ACO, accountable care organization; and HCC, hierarchical condition category.
